Wilhelm K. Essler

On Overcoming Incongruences

Über das Überwinden
von Inkongruenzen

übersetzt von
Gabriele A. Bassett

Cairo University
26 November 2018

Content

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(I) Introductory Remarks

I am grateful for having being invited to this well-known and world-renowned University of Cairo in order to participate in this conference with the subject "Theory and Practice" and, furthermore, to present a paper at this conference. I was invited by professor Hoda El-Khouly who two years ago was elected to become a member of the *Institut International de Philosophie (Paris);* so since that time we are colleagues.

Of course, I am interested in this subject "Theory and Practice" since my early youth, i.e.: since Gertrud Leuze, my former teacher in Latin, gave me books which contained translations of Pláton's dialogues. But later my academic career lead me to fields of research which are distinctly removed from this subject.

Therefore I am now not familiar with the results in this field established by other philosophers during the past decades; and therefore it probably may be that everything of which I intend to present here was already stated earlier by others and was developed by them perhaps in detail. The only thing which I am sure is that I will be able to defend all the statements which I will present now.

(II) From Is to Ought
(1) Intuition and Rationality

There are, of course, some connections between what ought to be and what is the case, as well as, what the person who intends to act believes what is the case, i.e.: within objective morality and subjective morality. Two of these connections are central, namely: Within statements of obligation –i.e.: what the operator "ought" refers to– the

concepts used there are all those of the informative aspect of using the respective language; i.e.: they are concepts which are developed in order to receive knowledge of the respective universe of discourse. And within conditional statements of obligation, the respective circumstances which determine the area of the obligation are statements of a purely informative language as long as they themselves do not contain deontic operators like "ought" or "allowed".

In Kant's sense, they are not Categorical Imperatives but Hypothetical Imperatives. And Hume, in contrast to Kant, dealt exclusively with these Hypothetical Imperatives, be they general or specified imperatives; like the early Kant, he also did not consider something like some Categorical Imperative at all.

By the way: Following some tradition in British Philosophy concerning the question of how to justify moral laws, the early Kant, too, believed that such laws cannot be justified –not even partially– by rational arguments in an intersubjective manner; but their –subjective– validity depends entirely on feelings of pleasure and pain, whereby that position already was the point of view of Aristídẹs of the Kyreneia, one of the followers of Sọkrátẹs. Why Kant later abandoned this view is a question of further research in the history of philosophy.

According to my own view, we everywhere in scientific research need both: *intuition* in order to *receive* results,[1] and *rationality* in order to *justify* results which were received by intuition, be this in empirical sciences or in mathematics or in logic or ... or in moral philosophy, esp. concerning *Hume's law*.

For, according to Hume's law, statements of obligations of this kind cannot be derived from statements of facts; and this thesis will be shared by all those philosophers who are sufficiently familiar with formal logic in general and deontic logic in particular. And regarding this thesis from a logical point of view, I too share this thesis.

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[1] By the way: The expression "intuition" –like German "Intuition"– is to be used close to "imagination" but not to the Latin expression „intuitio".

  Even Kant translated „intuitio" by „Anschauung" –i.e.: „outlook"– and nowhere by „Intuition".

(2) *On Fallacies*
  (a) *Prior's Fallacy*

But there are philosophers of the school of Ordinary Language Philosophy who did not share this thesis. One of them is A.N. Prior.[2]

His argument runs as follows: »The descriptive assertion "John Miller is a sea captain" logically implies the imperative statement "John Miller ought to do what a sea captain ought to do"«. At a first glance, the conclusion of this argument seems to be *one* imperative; and this imperative seems to be a logical consequence of that premise of that argument which thereby is regarded as merely being an assertion of a state of affairs.

But there is something wrong concerning that first glance, as may easily be assumed after a second glance by regarding that in the so-called conclusion the deontic expression "ought" occurs *twice.* And this second glance is confirmed by analyzing Prior's argument from a logical point of view.

For if that derivation were a logical one, it were independent from the sense of the descriptive expressions which occur in its sentences, esp. independent of the expression "sea captain". And therefore we therein may substitute the expression "sea captain" by "pickpocket" or even by "murderer"; and the result of this substitution will consist in the arguments: »[The descriptive statement] "John Miller is a pickpocket" logically implies [the imperative statement] "John Miller ought to do what a pickpocket ought to do"«, and: »[The descriptive statement] "John Miller is a murderer" logically implies [the imperative statement] "John Miller ought to do what a murderer ought to do"«.

But even Ordinary Language Philosophers –hopefully– will deny that these derived arguments are logically cogent.

And there is still another analysis which creates reasonable doubts whether that argument proofs that an imperative statement may be logically derived from solely descriptive statements. For within its conclusion: "John Miller ought to do what a sea captain ought to do" the

[2] See: A. MacIntyre "After Virtue" (2007), 57.

expression "ought" does not occur once only but twice; and this leads to the assumption that this statement is a hypothetical one of the kind "If this in an obligation then that is an obligation".

And this assumption is vindicated by analyzing the argument:

(1) »"John Miller is a sea captain" logically implies "John Miller ought to do what a sea captain ought to do"«

in the sense of logic –the way logic was developed by G. Frege– by determining its hidden background-premise[3] as:

(2) »"John Miller is a sea captain" and "A sea captain ought to behave according to a sea captain's [code of honour and duty]" logically implies "John Miller ought to behave according to a sea captain's [code of honour and duty]"«

and furthermore as:

(3) »"John Miller is a sea captain" and "Whenever someone is a sea captain then he ought to behave according to a sea captain's [code of honour and duty]" logically implies "John Miller ought to behave according to a sea captain's [code of honour and duty]"«

and finally as:

(4) »"Whenever someone is a sea captain then he ought to behave according to a sea captain's [code of honour and duty]" logically implies "If John Miller is a sea captain then John Miller ought to behave according to a sea captain's [code of honour and duty]"«

Obviously, Prior's argument analyzed according to (2) and (3) turns out to be an application of the logical rule of *modus ponens,* whereby the premises contain an ought-statement; and this shows that in fact Prior derives an ought-statement from another ought-statement [and another statement which mentions some circumstance].

Furthermore, his argument analyzed according as (4) turns out to be an application of the logical rule of *specification;* and this, too, shows that in fact Prior derives an ought-statement from another ought-statement.

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[3] This background-premise is determined by asking: "Why ought John Miller to behave in such a manner? ". For then obviously the answer will be either: "Whenever someone is a sea captain then he ought to behave according to a sea captain's [code of honour and duty]" or a statement which logically implies this answer.

In regarding (3) and using hereby the terminology of G.E. Moore, the premise "Whenever someone is a sea captain he ought to behave according to a sea captain's [code of honour and duty]" is a *bridge principle.* But –according to Moore as well as to my own view– in general such bridge principles are false because of the incompleteness of their premises: Even if the set of all relevant circumstances were finite we would not be able to overview them all-together; and if not all of them are regarded as parts of the premise, then such a bridge principle –i.e.: such a *universal* implication– sooner or later will turn out to be false because of its stated universality by lack of information concerning the set of circumstances. And this holds even more if the set of all relevant circumstances were infinite.

In regarding (4) and using hereby the terminology of Kant, the premise "Whenever someone is a sea captain he ought to behave according to a sea captain's [code of honour and duty]" is a *universal hypothetical imperative,* whereas the conclusion "If John Miller is a sea captain then John Miller ought to behave according to a sea captain's [code of honour and duty]" is a *specific hypothetical imperative.*

Up to now I used the expression "sea captain" which occurs in the Premise of argument (1) in the purely descriptive sense according to "possessing the licence to work as sea captain". But it may be assumed that Prior used "sea captain" in the sense of "possessing the licence to work as sea captain and feeling obliged to the sea captain's [code of honour and duty]". But then in fact Prior himself derives –hidden by pecularities of the ordinary English language– an ought-statement from another ought-statement and not from an is-statement.

Most probably Prior and his followers were not aware that by using the *one expression* "sea captain" they used it according to the *two concepts*, i.e.: within the premise of (1) according to "possessing the licence to work as sea captain", and within the conclusion of (1) according to "possessing the licence to work as sea captain and feeling obliged to the sea captain's [code of honour and duty]". But then their argument (1) is, of course, a fallacy in the sense of logic.

(b) Searle's Fallacy

Still less sophisticated is the argument presented by J. Searle.[4] For his argument runs as follows: »From "John Miller promised to pay Jack Smith 5.000,-- dollars" it logically follows "John Miller ought to pay Jack Smith 5.000,-- dollars"«.

This so-called logical implication may in fact be an analytical implication, namely: when the concept "promised" is used according to rules so that it entails the rules of using the concept "ought to". But then, again, it is not the case that an is-statement [= a descriptive statement] entails logically –or rather: analytically– an ought-statement [= an imperative statement], but in fact an ought-statement entails logically –or rather: analytically– another ought-statement. This is comparable to the fact that: "John Miller is a bachelor" logically –or rather: analytically– entails "John Miller is a [male] man".

This is not the case when the concept "promised" is used according to rules so that it does not entail the rules of using "ought to" i.e.: if it is used in a purely descriptive sense.

But most probably also Searle and his followers, too, were not aware that by using the one expression "promising" they used it according to the two concepts, i.e.: within the premise according to "having performed some verbal act", and within the conclusion according to "being obliged to perform some physical act according to that already performed verbal act". But then their argument is, of course, a fallacy in the sense of logic.

In order to transform that argument into a logically valid one[5] we have to add another statement to the former premise, namely: "Whenever someone promises something to some person, then he is obliged to give this other person what he promised to give". But this premise –this bridge principle– is nothing but a general hypothetical imperative. Therefore, again, an ought-statement is logically derived

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[4] See: J. Searle „How to derive 'Ought' from 'Is' " (1964), 43-58.
  See the detailed analysis of his argument in: W.K. Essler „Wissenschaftstheorie IV" (1978).
[5] Namely: by finding out a satisfactory answer to the question: "Why ... ".

from a set of premises which necessarily contain some ought-statement but not from a set of purely is-statements.

By the way: Also here Moore is vindicated. For if I am promising something, I may not be aware that I will not be able to do what I promised, or that in the meantime I will become unable to do it, or that things outside of me changed in a manner that I really should not do what I promised, or be it that it is inappropriate to act according to the promise, for moral reasons, as he has realized in the meantime, … , and so on.

The ordinary languages in general and the English language in particular sometimes are hiding –or even disregarding– structures of logic; for they arose because of other causes and circumstances than that of rational decisions made within the area of exactly analyzing philosophy.

(c) MacIntyre's Fallacy

Still less sophisticated, too, is the argument presented by A. MacIntyre.[6] For his argument runs as follows: »From: "This watch of mine is grossly inaccurate and irregular in time-keeping and in addition too heavy to carry about comfortably" the evaluative conclusion validly follows: "This is a bad watch!"«.

Of course, this conclusion is convincing to MacIntyre as far as the circumstances of his life as a university teacher are concerned. But surely it would not be accepted by him if he had to stay alone on some lost island like Robinson Crusoe when suddenly waves brought some piece of luggage to the beach containing such a watch, or when this watch is a heirloom of his father and of his grandfather and of his great-grandfather, or …, and so on.

In order to make this argument cogent und therefore logically valid, again such a bridge principle has to be added as an additional premise to the given premise: a universal statement which in this universality surely is false.

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[6] See: A. MacIntyre "After Virtue" (1981), 148-150.

Of course, according to MacIntyre's view, the sense of the concepts "grossly inaccurate" etc. already contain the sense of "bad". But then, again, an evaluative statement is not derived from non-evaluative statements, but from evaluative ones, comparable to the case of deriving "man" from "bachelor".

As far as I know, ordinary languages never developed according to purposes of philosophical analysis; and esp. the English ordinary language easily is subject to perform fallacies.

For look at the conclusion of MacIntyre's argument, i.e. look at: "This a bad watch!": This conclusion is convincing for MacIntyre because he valuates what the premises describe as bad things. But suppose that his neighbour MacLaughlan, too, is in possession of such a watch, so to speak: of a twin-piece of MacIntyre's watch. Then regard the three premises: "This watch of mine is grossly inaccurate and irregular in time-keeping and in addition too heavy to carry about comfortably" at first in its purely cognitive or rather descriptive sense; and afterwards have a view onto MacLaughlan's preferences: "This watch of mine is heavy to carry about comfortably: fine, for then no thief will carry it away!", and: "This watch of mine is grossly inaccurate and irregular in time-keeping: fine, for then the people around me will become confused and finally angry, which will make me happy!". But then, of course, MacLaughlan's conclusion will be: "This a good watch!"

This indicates that in MacIntyre's intention the conclusion: "This is a bad watch!" is to be analyzed as follows: "This is a bad watch for everyone!"; but this conclusion, obviously, is false. True may be the assertions: "This is a bad watch for MacIntyre!" as well as: "This is a good watch for MacLaughlan!"

In fact, when MacIntyre developed his argument in question he obviously was tied down by shortcomings of his ordinary language; and being tied down and therefore not being able to regard such shortcomings, he as well as his followers, they all were not aware of being tied down by them; and they therefore were not able to analyze the premises of that argument according to the means of a sound logic. And furthermore, they all were not able to distinguish clearly the purely descriptive –in short: objective– sense of this premises from the added

evaluative –in short: subjective– sense of them. Mixing all these things constitute the background-premises of that argument; but MacIntyre and his followers obviously were not recognized this background-mixture.

(3) On Bridges
(a) On Deontic Logics

This holds when an assertoric logic is involved, but also when some deontic logic is used.[7]

Thereby a deontic logic is to be embedded into a modal logic according to the principle that *there is no obligation beyond possibility.* By regarding the semantics of such systems of logic, this may be seen: If there were some correct derivation from an is-statement to a necessary-statement then this modal logic would collapse to the assertoric logic which underlies that modal logic, like the assertions:

- "Everything which is the case, is necessarily the case";[8]
- "Everything which necessarily is the case, is good".[9]
- "Everything which is good, is ought."

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[7] By the way: In philosophical analyses I myself do not use modal logics and deontic logics; for these intensional means are too weak with regard to the purpose to receive strong results. On the contrary, according to Carnap, I am using the extensional equivalences at the respective meta-levels.

A deontic logic consists of a system of intensionally used logical rules which are related to concepts like "ought" and "allowed", whereby these ones are used in its general and non-specified manner.

[8] I suppose that Leibniz was not the first philosopher who implicitly maintained a position of this kind. According to Leibniz, the Creator never creates something by chance, but creates everything according to necessity in order to create *this world* as *the best of all possible worlds;* we human beings, however, are not able to discover this necessity.

Kant, however, maintained that all non-apriorical truths are true by chance and not by necessity. This obviously was asserted by Kant against the view of Leibniz.

[9] According to Thomas Aquinas, a statement of this kind may be formulated like: "Omne ens est unum–verum–bonum".

But assertions of that kind were formulated much earlier like the Creator's observation according to the Genesis of the Gospel:

" ... And He regarded that [what was created by Him] was good".

With this understanding, however, all evils would be good and therefore ought to be. Therefore, no congruent system of some deontic logic will serve as a bridge from Is to Ought.

But since there is no correct deontic derivation of such a kind, additional bridge principles are therefore needed in order to justify the conclusion; but, according to Moore, they mostly are false.

Nevertheless, they are absolutely necessary in order to be able to refer to the right action: to what in this empirical world, in which actions are to be carried out, is acted upon in such a way as is morally required; in this sense they function as bridges between the *empirical world* and –using Kant's terminology again– the *moral world.*

(b) On Categorical Imperatives

Kant's *Categorical Imperative* does not work like such a bridge-principle,[10] in his terminology: it is *not* a [universal] *Hypothetical Imperative;* for a Categorical Imperative is not –and, according to Kant: it must not be– connected with empirical conditions. Therefore according to Kant, a Categorical Imperative does not –and cannot– logically imply some Hypothetical Imperative.

By the way: This is related to the fact that the principle of causality does not –and cannot– logically imply some causal law. But the principle of causality is an apriorical criterion concerning the correctness of an aposteriorical causal law, determining thereby whether or not this empirical law is congruent with the content of that apriorical principle.

And in the related manner a Categorical Imperative is an apriorical criterion concerning the correctness of some Hypothetical Imperative in question, determining thereby whether or not this Hypothetical Imperative is congruent with the content of that Categorical Imperative.

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[10] Both the Kantian *Categorical Imperative* and the Rawlsian *Veil of Ignorance* are to be regarded as sophisticated elaboration of the archaic *Golden Rule.*
See: J. Rawls "A Theory of Justice" (1971); see also: J: Habermas " Noch einmal: Zum Verhältnis von Theorie und Praxis", in: J. Habermas "Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung" (1999), 319-334.

By the way: Kant mentioned more than one version of the *Categorical Imperative;* and in a strict sense of the word these versions are *not logically equivalent.* But they are *congruent* one to another in that sense that with regard to the Hypothetical Imperatives they seem to lead to the same results, at least in an approximate manner.

They all are sophisticated elaborations of the *Golden Rule.*[11] This Golden Rule may be stated in both directions as follows:

GR: "Do to another what you like them to do you; and do not do to another what you do not like them to do you!"

This Golden Rule is to be regarded as being of approximate kind. For purposes of everyday situations[12] this rule mostly is sufficiently precise. Nevertheless it is the obligation of philosophers to clear and to clean it up to that point where it seems that no further objection may be possible. Among Kant's results of analyzing it, this one is the most famous one:[13]

CI: "Act only according to that maxim whereby at the same time you can will that it should become a universal law!"[14]

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[11] According to the oldest written tradition, this Golden Rule was stated and was thereby justified by Buddha Śākyamuni; see AN III-66. But most surely, its oral tradition is much older.

[12] Of course, for ordinary purposes the Golden Rule is –and will remain to be– a very useful instrument to direct one's mind into the direction of morality.

   Everyday situations may include resp. should include situations of dispensation of justice and situations of politics.

   This rule still may be regarded as an approximate rule, being valid in even this sense, i.e.: not in a strict sense, not without thereby involving suitable probability considerations.

   NB: This Golden Rule, too, is an unconditional rule; and it therefore may be regarded as the archaic form of a Categorical Imperative.

   By the way: This Golden Rule must not be identified with the Do-ut-des Rule, say: "I give [you], expecting thereby that you will give [me]!"; for this is not a rule of morality but a rule of business.

[13] This is the famous version of Kant's Categorical Imperative; see "KpV" and esp. "GMS".

[14] Some *universal law* may be either a law of the *cognitive world* [= the world of facts] or a law of the *moral world* [= the world of morality]; during the past years I

Up to now it seems to be the still best mental instrument in order to assess Hypothetical Imperatives with regard to their respective formal validity.

Whenever someone intends to act with his mind or with his speech or with his body in a conscious manner according to morality, whenever he tries to avoid to act as a robot, but to direct his mind and his speech and his body according to some sound categorical imperative, he *then* needs to refer to such Hypothetical Imperatives, be them of universal kind or be them of a specific kind, i.e.: specialized to some specific situation.

(c) On Hypothetical Imperatives

Let us regard some arbitrary Hypothetical Imperative in its universal kind. In order to be regarded as valid, the antecedens of this implication has to be seen as being complete.

But in almost every case of stating this universal implication its antecedens –stating a set of relevant factors– is incomplete with regard to the set of all relevant factors, even if this set is finite;[15] for the complete extension of that set is mostly unknown to us, especially at its periphery. But then a universalization of such an implication with an incomplete antecedens sooner or later will turn out to be invalid; and then it is worthless at least in its philosophical cases of application.

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became sure that what Kant meant here is that the universal law is a law of justice, where justice is based on morality but is slightly different from morality.

  In short: For within the *moral world* this law *is* already a universal law, whereas in the *cognitive world* this law *should become* a universal law, so that finally the cognitive world and the moral world will coincide:

CI: „Act as if the maxims of your actions were to become through your will a law of nature!"

[15] If this set is infinite, then the respective premise [= precedens, = antecedens] of the implication is necessarily incomplete, since it is referring to a finite part of this set only.

Nevertheless concerning acting, a philosopher –i.e.: friend of wisdom– needs such a bridge from the world of facts to the world of morality, which means: he needs such a Hypothetical Imperative at least in its specific form, which is to be used during the period of application in order to justify this application.

In order to discover –perhaps I should say: to establish– such a bridge it is necessary at first to analyze the premise of such a particular Hypothetical Imperative from a logical point of view. This may lead to the supposition that at least most of the factors [which are relevant concerning what one ought to do] are recognized within this premise. Therefore the probability[16] of being not disturbed by unknown factors may be of value $1-\varepsilon$, whereby the real number ε depends on the *estimated* degree of remaining non-considered factors.

Furthermore, it is all but congruent *not to demand* that the succedens must *not* insist that *it is obliged* that the state mentioned in the succedens may become real –in other words: that *with probability 1 it is obliged* that this may become the case–, but *to demand* that *with probability $1-\varepsilon$ it is obliged* that this may become reality.[17]

Of course, if two different probability values ε_1 and ε_2, were regarded there –ε_1 for the antecedence, the premise, and ε_2 for the consequence, the conclusion–, this would not be any inconsistency, i.e.: no logical contradiction. But it then will be all but easy to present some convincing argument for weighing the premise and the conclusion of

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[16] The objective probability is unknown to us in most cases of intending to act.
   Therefore, a suitable subjective probability factor is to be used, which is based on some probability distribution according to the apriorically determined assumptions of the user.
   In epistemology, such a user is to be cleaned from all emotional aspects so that his probability method becomes a method of epistemic probability, in Carnap's terminology: an inductive method.

[17] As far as I know, up to now the concept "ought" respectively "obligation" is analyzed by philosophers only according to its qualitative aspect.
   But in everyday situations , too, are using this concept in addition in its comparative aspect according to: "He ought to do X rather than [he ought to do] Y". And in rough quantitative aspects we are using this concept according to: "He probably – respectively very probably, respectively highly probably, resp. most probably– ought to do X instead of Y".

that hypothetical imperative in a different manner, on the contrary: The obligation mentioned in the succedens may loose its validity as soon as additional information are added to the antecedens, namely: informations whose content decreases the relevance of parts of the up-to-now content of the succedens.

And only if the value ε of this factor turns out to be 0 and therefore the value 1- ε turns out to be 1, then the *universalization* of this implication will be valid, too.[18]

But in all major cases this value will not be 1 but will be close to 1 only, i.e.: 1–ε, where ε is a sufficiently small real number. For purposes of everyday life –including dispensation of justice and of politics– no more is available; and, in fact, no more is needed in order to act in a moral sense.

Concerning the *world of facts,* we have to stay and to live at all time with uncertainties, mostly identifying thereby *approximately identical* with *identical.* And in most cases this kind of living and of experiencing does not lead us to incongruences.[19] When relating the *world of morality* to the *world of facts* by stating a Hypothetical

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[18] NB: The probability value of the premise of the particular Hypothetical Imperative is– presupposing some kind of independence between the facts mentioned in the premise– identical with the expectation value of this premise.

If this expectation value 1–ε is close to 1, e.g. 0,998 when ε = 0,002, then in about 0 of 10 cases as well as in about 0 of 100 cases counterexamples are to be expected, but are to be expected in 2 of 1.000 cases and in 20 of 10.000 cases and ... and so on.

And this means: If the probability value of the *specification* is less than 1, then in the long run counterexamples are to be expected; and therefore it is to be expected that the *universal* hypothetical imperative ist false so that a congruent theory of epistemological probability has to regard such universal Hypothetical Imperatives of being of probability 0, even if the probability of the *specified* Hypothetical Imperative is close to 1.

In this sense, Carnap's theory of inductive logic deals cases of this kind in a congruent manner, in contrast to Hintikka's theory of inductive manner, which is incongruent concerning this point of view. But nevertheless, both theories are consistent ones.

[19] In fact, this is the manner in which we receive knowledge in everyday situations as well as in scientific situations. For an error caused by perceiving as well as by measuring can only be excluded by probability 1–ε but not by probability 1.

Nevertheless, even a physicist mostly will regard 1–ε as being 1, and this both in his performing experiments and in ordinary life; for otherwise he would be unable to proceed here and there.

Imperative in its specified form, our statements of morality related to – and thus conditioned by– supposed empirical facts, too, become uncertain to some degree.

In order to act in congruence with the principles of morality, we need such guide principles, i.e.: such specified Hypothetical Imperatives; for the only alternative to using them consists in acting in mental blindness, like it happens to us in actions of reflexes or like a robot is acting.

Of course, identifying *approximately identical* with *identical* is a theoretical mistake; therefore the rational user –and especially the philosopher– all the time has to be aware of having done this theoretical mistake. For then, if disturbing factors will arise –factors which up to then were not known and therefore were not regarded by him– he immediately will identify this theoretical mistake as being the source of these disturbances; and he then will be caused to correct his presuppositions. But also after correcting this mistake for practical reasons he will be compelled again to make another similar theoretical mistake as long as he does not know all relevant circumstances.

Of course, this is all but an easy way of experiencing as well as of acting; but it is the only way which is open to us. And it is a very useful way for us; for it is much better for us to carefully walk across this way than to perform an agenda of U-turns in mental blindness.

(III) *From Ought to Act*

Now, of course, the question arises whether or not there, too, exists a bridge from *ought-to-do* to *to-do,* i.e.: from *ought* to *act,* from *insight into morality* to *action according to this insight.* But there is no theoretical path from an insight to the according action:[20] There does not exist a logical conclusion from the one to the other in the positive case and, too, no logical inconsistency in the negative case.

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[20] Of course, there exist logical conclusions from an insight to some necessarily included other insight. But each insight is a statement, whereas an action is no statement, not even a statement of the inner language, of the area of thoughts; for an inner action is a decision, an orientating of the mind.

And it happens all but seldom that people do not act according to what they really regard as ought to be done; this incongruence is no contradiction but, alas, a reality.

Using the terminology of logic, some statement which is a contradiction describes something which is impossible. But acting in non-congruence with insight into morality is possible; therefore, these incongruences are no contradictions.

Of course, in the positive case we will regard the action as being congruent with the insight, whereas in the negative case we regard what was done as being incongruent to what ought to have been done. And obviously no cogent intellectual bridge from *ought-to-do* to *to-do* is to be discovered even at the horizon of our thoughts:

It is possible that someone acts in the sense of morality without referring thereby to some insight into morality; and this is not only possible but, luckily, very often real. And it is possible that someone receives insight into morality –be it as a result of having been instructed by others or be it as a result of his or her own thinking concerning this matter– without acting in the sense of morality; and this is not only possible but, alas, very often real. For, if someone's moral sensitivity is somehow degenerated, no cogent moral argument will lead him to acting according to morality.[21]

Actions may be actions of body or actions of speech or actions of mind. Thereby, actions of body need not to be explained here.

An action of speech may consist as some outer verbal acting like telling or ordering or may consist in some inner verbal acting like thinking or judging. The results of telling and ordering are statements and orderings, whereas the results of thinking and judging are thoughts and judgments.[22]

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[21] But this is not a peculiarity of morality; for things of that kind may be observed even in seminars on logic: If some student is not even able to use the modus ponens –i.e.: if he does not know how to derive from premises "A" and "If A then B" to the obvious conclusion "B"–, then he will never attain some intellectual sense concerning logical consequences.

[22] See: Pláton "Sophistes": "Thinking is speaking of the psyché with itself". But I am convinced that this thesis was already maintained by Prōtagóras in his –alas lost– book "On Truth".

An action of mind –being regarded here as being different from an inner speaking– consists in developing some psychic state which afterwards is working as the mental point of view, especially concerning morality.

Of course, acting and its result are closely related to each other, since the result consists in the end of the action where acting stopped; but nevertheless both are to be distinguished. For concerning morality, the result of acting is to be related to insight which determines whether or not this result is congruent with some rough or with some subtle formulation of the Golden Rule. But the acting itself is not lead solely by insight at all, especially when moral sensitivity –whose verbal form is to be formulated by some Golden Rule or by some Categorical Imperative– is weak at the time of acting or when this moral sensitivity is completely underdeveloped.

In order to develop and to strengthen the mental power of moral sensitivity so much that this power will finally start dominating the mind, these two components accompanied by moral sensitivity are to be developed and to be strengthened: the mental power of insight, and the mental power of will, whereby the expression "insight" [= "Einsicht"] is used by me in the sense of Kant, and whereas the expression "will" [= "Wille"] is used by me in the sense of Schopenhauer.[23]

Even some sophisticated insight is powerless if this insight is accompanied by a will which is an uneducated one, so to speak: an uncultivated one, not cultivated in congruence with the insight. And such a wild and non-educated will will always lead mind and speech and body to perform actions which are not congruent with the already gained insight.

For, as far as I see, the only way to avoid such moral incongruences consists in training the will in one's own mind in order to increase the

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But centuries earlier, this thesis was already maintained by Buddha Śākyamuni and his disciples; see, e.g.: MN 44 ["Dhammadinna"].
[23] In that philosophical sense, *will* is different from *consideration.* For every time the will immediately causes the act, as well as everytime the act is caused by the immediately proceeded will.

power of one's moral sensitivity, i.e.: to educate one's will so that insight and will become more and more congruent.[24]

Because of my laziness in this matter I cannot show any relevant experiences in this area; but I suspect that this requires less effort than what a top athlete does to achieve his goal. Therefore such a *practical bridge* is established individually by performing these three methods, performed one after another:

(1) training, and (2) training, and again (3) training.[25]

For the path from *theoretical insight into the moral world* to the *practical creation of one's own moral world* does *not* consist in a *theoretical argument* but in a *practical behaviour:* in training one's mind in order to increase one's attention and mindfulness and vigilance concerning one's acting by mind and by speech and by body.

Finally the question arises as to increase these mental factors within one's mind. Alas, I do not have a final answer to it at my disposal. But I assume that we should take into account these two different states of the mind of a person: (1) a state in which altruism dominates the mind, where no excessively strong effort is required to train the mind; and (2) a state in which egoism dominates the mind, where considerable efforts must then be made in order to educate and to cultivate and to refine this mental position in such a way that from the outside –i.e. for other persons– it will become anything but easy to determine whether this mind is guided by altruism or by some subtle egoism.[26]

If someone's mind is guided by altruism, then –as far as I see it without being guided by such a mind– the only effort he needs to

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[24] In viewing related formulations of Kant this may be formulated as:
  "Insight without supporting will is weak; and will without leading insight is blind."
[25] The amount of respective efforts which some person has to investigate depends on the precondition of this person, comparable to the amount regarding logic or chess or skiing or ... or morality: Some few persons need not struggle too much, while others have to fight.
[26] Such a subtle egoism shows itself to the person himself in thoughts like: "I want to act in an altruistic manner, because *I* like to be valued and respected by all other people, so that they will think that *I* am a noble person!", as well as: "I will act in an altruistic manner, since *I* want to become happy!"

establish is to maintain and to strengthen his regarding every other human being –or even more: not only every other *animal rationaliter* but *every other animal*– to belong to one's own family, whether it is his brother or his sister or his father or his mother or his son or his daughter. He thereby may lead his view to the fact that all human beings –and furthermore all sentient beings– are offsprings of the same source of life, as may be seen when turning one's mind back some millions of years.

If, on the contrary, someone's mind is dominated and therefore is guided by egoism in such a way that it is all but easy for him to turn his mind into the direction of altruism, then he should at least clean his basic mental attitude as well as his corresponding actions from all primitive and coarse egoistic forms of egoism. Without being able to show a significant amount of my own experience in this regard, I assume that then –without him deceiving himself– the firm knowledge like: "*I* have done the best *I* was able to do!" will become the source of his thinking and feeling, thus a kind of cleaned self-respect. And this will cause his mind to become calm; and he will continue his final life-time without mental disturbances, accompanied with this cleaned self-respect.

This self-respect will eventually become independent on whether other people will esteem his way of life or not.[27]

In the event that his mind is dominated by altruism, the goal of self-respect may not be in his mind, but it will nevertheless appear in his mind as an accompaniment to his basic attitude.

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[27] See again: AN III-66 ["Kālāma"].

Before the life-time of Sọkrátẹs, at least Họrákleitos and Dẹmókritos seem to be examples of philosophers who maintained such a way of life.

Incidentally, if someone shapes his actions with the intention of being respected by others as a moral person now and in the future, then he acts according to the Do-ut-des Rule, even if this is not done in a coarse way.

According to Diogénẹs Laértios, Plátọn, for example, was very anxious in his actions to be valued in such a way then and afterwards; and his speaking and writing were determined by this goal.

And I assume that in both cases the respective kind of self-respect might be helpful in order to make progress on that path of self-education:

  ⋆ It is helpful to detect [it a case of positive acting of mind or speech or body] that at the same time the self-respect increases, which is then accompanied by a subtle and long-lasting bliss.

  ⋆ And in the case of a subtle egoism it is also helpful to want to experience this subtle bliss again and again and longer and finally incessantly.

And on the other hand it is certainly helpful in a case of negative actions to detect that simultaneously the self-respect decreases, which also goes hand in hand with an inner speech to oneself, in which one tells oneself again and again that one had to act in the way one had acted, which is an inner disturbance, which in one's own mind produces a considerable amount of restlessness for a long time; and it is beneficial not to want to experience such experiences.[28]

But someone who is suffering from mental masochism surely will decide to walk the steep path downhill; and no argument whatsoever will convince him. For his uneducated and uncultivated will will always dominate his mind.

That is why this observance for one's own self-respect and its effect as a subtle experience of bliss will only convince those people who are reluctant to experience such disturbances and unrest in their minds.[29] These, however, will notice that increasing self-respect generates and strengthens respect for other people or even for other living beings step by step, as well as that increasing respect for others will at the same time strengthen and secure one's own self-respect.

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[28] Suppose I do a great deal of damage to someone I consider my enemy; then a strong feeling of happiness immediately develops in me. But this feeling goes hand in hand with anger and rage as well as –gnawing– subtle notion or even knowledge that this action was wrong. Moreover, that feeling of happiness will quickly diminish and then soon disappear, whereas that anger and that knowledge will last much longer; and even then, when these two disappear on the surface of the mind, they will always reappear during the smallest occasions.

[29] Again, see AN III-66 [Kālāma"].

Even if a subtle egoism prevails, other people will not be able to determine whether his actions have taken place through altruism or through such an educated and cultivated subtle egoism. And it cannot be ruled out that in such a purified mind the power of altruism will increase and prosper slowly but surely, the mind's beauty being then perfected.

(IV) Concluding Remark

In this manner, everybody determines his own future mental destiny during his respective present.

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Appendix

Appendix 1:

What is the meaning of "congruence"?

Now finally it will be observed that I frequently used the expressions "congruent" and "incongruent" as well as "congruence", and "incongruence" without mentioning any rule on how to use them. I have to confess that no exact and convincing definitions of them are available to me.

Of course, the concept of logical consequence will be a part and furthermore the well-defined centre of the concept of congruence; and the concept of logical contradiction will be a part and furthermore the well-defined centre of the concept of incongruence. But these concepts of congruence and of incongruence are used here mainly outside of this respective centre.

I assume that the rules on how to use these expressions will be related somehow to Kant's concept "beauty" [= "Schönheit"][30] which obviously is somehow related to the concept "simplicity" [= Einfachheit"][31] as it is used in philosophy of science concerning physical laws and theories as well as in philosophy of language concerning concepts.

Maybe in this context this concept "congruence" will turn out to be an elaboration and refinement of the complex concept "beauty of the ensemble of the [firmly accepted] moral laws and principles".

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[30] See: Kant "KdU".
[31] See e.g.: W.K. Essler "Wissenschaftstheorie III"; and see: D. Schoch "Ein topologisches Einfachheitskriterium zur rationalen Theorienwahl" (1997), 471-480.

Appendix 2:

The Four Great Sages

At Tokyo there is the *Tetsugakudō-Kōen*, the *Philosophy-Park,* erected by Dr. Inoue Enryō during 1904-1916. One of the pagodas there is the *Shiseidō,* the *Hall of the Four Sages:*

:: Kung Fu Zi [front top of the temple];
:: Buddha Śākyamuni [right top of the temple];
:: Sọkrátẹs [left top of the temple];
:: Immanuel Kant [back top of the temple].

Front top of the Shiseido

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